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1 Introduction
According to the traditional scal federalism literature (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972),
decentralizing taxing powers is much more problematic than decentralizing expendit-
ure functions, because of the tax-base mobility threat and also because of the likely
violations of the principle of horizontal equity among identical individuals living in
di¤erent jurisdictions of the federation. Despite these normative prescriptions, in the
real world we observe important federal countries, like Canada and the United States,
in which some of the main tax bases (e.g. corporate income, personal income, retail
sales or excise taxes) are shared between the upper and the lower levels of government.
Hence in these countries there is not a rigorous distinction between local and federal
tax bases, as the traditional scal federalism theory prescribes. However, whenever this
distinction does not occur, the tax bases of di¤erent layers of government overlap, giv-
ing rise to a common pool problem  the so-called vertical tax externality with the
tax decision of each level of government a¤ecting the shared tax base, a fact generally
leading to excessive taxation (Keen, 1995).
The literature analysing this issue (e.g. Boadway et al., 1998; Keen and Kotsogi-
annis, 2002; Dahlby and Wilson, 2003) assumes welfare maximizing governments and
therefore it takes a normative approach to the tax assignment problem. However, it
is widely recognized that also political institutions play a crucial role in shaping scal
policies, in addition to normative criteria. Indeed, the introduction of political factors
into the traditional scal federalism models is the distinctive feature of the so-called
second generationtheory of scal federalism (Oates, 2005). In this paper, our goal is
to add a contribution to this eld, by analyzing how the tax assignment problem in a
federation is a¤ected by the activity of a special interest group that lobbies the policy
makers for moderate taxation when tax bases overlap.
In particular, we consider a federation composed of an upper level (federal) and a
lower level (state) of government. Policy makers are assumed to be revenue maximizers
and can levy an excise tax on a consumersgood that is produced in an imperfectly
competitive market. There are no direct interactions between the state policy makers,
since consumers are assumed to be immobile. If only one layer of government is allowed
to tax, total taxation falls short of the social optimum, provided that rms succesfully
lobby for tax rates reductions. When both layers of government are entitled to tax, total
taxation may be either higher or lower than the social optimum, since the distortion
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due to the vertical tax externality and the distortion due to lobbying work in opposite
directions.
Our main nding concerns the link between market structure, inuence of the lobby,
and the optimal tax assignment. If the market is highly concentrated, and if lobbying
is highly e¤ective, then aggregate tax revenue is maximized by entitling both layers of
government with the power to tax. A highly e¤ective lobbying can therefore justify tax
base sharing among government layers of a federal nation. In this case, lobbying by
rms works as a privatesolution to the vertical tax externality problem, that could
make redundant the adoption of a public solution in the form of a compensation
transfer mechanism (Boadway and Keen, 1996; Kotsogiannis, forthcoming). On the
other hand, if lobbying is not very e¤ective in inuencing policy makers, whatever the
degree of market power, or if lobbying is highly e¤ective but rms have low market
power, it is then optimal to assign taxation only to one layer of government.
We also consider a special case in which the policy maker of the state in which
production is located refrains from full tax revenue maximization, due to her concern
about occupational levels in the taxed industry. The introduction of this kind of pref-
erence heterogeneity allows us to derive some interesting asymmetric equilibria that
closely match observed tax policy in the real world.
Lobbying by special interest groups has been recently introduced in the scal fed-
eralism literature by Bordignon et al. (2008). They focus on the role of lobbying on
the choice between centralization and decentralization of public policies, nding that
centralization is better for social welfare when the lobbying groups have conicting in-
terests, whereas decentralization might be better when the lobbies interests are aligned.
This paper introduces lobbying in a more specic context than the one examined by
Bordignon et al. (2008). Moreover, while they appeal, to model lobbying behavior,
to the many-principals, one-agent (Dixit et al., 1997) and to the many-principals,
many-agents (Prat and Rustichini, 2003) literature, we appeal in this paper to the
one-principal, many-agents literature (Segal, 1999).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model
and characterizes the equilibrium in the oligopoly markets, for given tax rates. It also
derives the social optimum, that is the tax rates that maximize the policy makers
objective functions in the benchmark case of no vertical tax externalities and no lob-
bying. Section 3 considers tax setting in the federation in the presence of vertical tax
externalities between higher and lower levels of government. Section 4 introduces lob-
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bying by producers and examines its impact on tax policy. Section 5 addresses the tax
assignment problem, i.e. whether it is better to give the power to tax only to one level
of government or to both levels. Section 6 provides conclusions and lines for future
research.
2 The framework
Consider a federation composed of the central (or federal) government and two regional
(or state) governments. Both layers of government might be entitled to levy an excise
tax on a commodity that is consumed in both regions but that is produced only in one
region.1 We rule out the possibility of cross border shopping by assuming that con-
sumers make purchases of the good only in their own region of residence. The number
of producers is given and we assume that they compete à la Cournot in each regional
market.2 Policy makers at all levels are assumed to care for tax revenue collected.
However, tax policy may not be exclusively determined by Leviathan behavior. Policy
makers may also be interested in cashing campaign contributions o¤ered by rms in
exchange for tax rates cuts. Moreover, we consider the possibility that the policy maker
in charge in the jurisdiction in which production takes place may refrain from setting
a high tax burden, in order to limit the negative impact on production, and thus on
occupational levels, in the taxed industry. Consumerssurplus, instead, is assumed to
bear no weight whatsoever in tax policy setting.3
Tax setting is modelled as a two-stage process. In the rst stage, the producers
association lobbies the policy makers in order to win tax rates cuts that increase rms
prots. In the second stage, the central and the local policy makers simultaneously and
1This is just a stylized way for capturing the fact that production of some commodities is usually
concentrated in some regions, whereas its consumption is uniformly distributed across regions.
2We consider consumption-based commodity-taxation only in a specic (or excise) form, although
it is well known that specic and ad valorem taxes are not equivalent in terms of tax incidence if
the taxed goods are exchanged in non-competitive markets (see, e.g. Myles, 1995, chapter 11, for a
throughout survey). One reason for this choice is that we have in mind goods like cigarettes, gasoline
or alcoholic drinks, that are generally taxed in a specic form, although in some countries a mix of
both types of tax instruments is applied (Cnossen, 2009). Another reason is that our analysis focuses
on the interplay between vertical tax externalities and lobbying and not, like most of the literature
dealing with the comparison of the two types of tax instruments, on e¢ cient tax structures.
3This is an extreme but simple way for capturing the idea that it is desirable to limit the consumption
of the taxed good, either for paternalistic reasons (like in the case of unhealthy cigarettes smoking) or
for correcting market failures (like in the case of pollution generating gasoline consumption).
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independently set their own tax rate.4 There is then a third and nal stage in which
local markets equilibrium is determined, given the tax rates set at the previous stages.
The model is solved backward. We thus start from the nal stage and solve for the
equilibrium in the regional markets.
2.1 Regional oligopoly markets
We model an oligopoly market in each region i, i = 1; 2, in a partial equilibrium
framework. All rms are located in region 2 and their number, m  1, is xed (the
model encompasses a monopoly market as a limit case for m = 1). We also assume
that all rms are identical, selling an homogenous good in both regions and producing
at constant marginal (and average) costs c > 0 (there are no xed costs).
Consumers are immobile and purchase the consumption good at the prevailing
market price only in their own region of residence. They are also assumed to be identical
both within and across regions, with an individual demand function that takes a linear
form:
q = b(a  p), (1)
where p is the consumers price, q is quantity consumed, a > 0 and b > 0 are the
demand parameters. Let Qi be aggregate consumption and let ni > 0, i = 1; 2, be
the mass of consumers that are resident in region i; we also normalize the mass of
consumers resident in the federation to unity, i.e. n1 + n2 = 1. By aggregating the
individual demand (1) we then get the inverse market demand in region i as:
pi = a  Qi
bni
, i = 1; 2. (2)
Let T and ti be the specic tax rates levied, on a destination basis, respectively by
the federal and the state i governments, on rmssales.5 Let qji be the quantity sold
4An alternative modelling strategy would be to consider a Stackelberg game and therefore to split
the second stage into two sub-stages, with the federal policy maker choosing rst and the regional
policy makers choosing second.
5We are assuming that producers make direct sales to consumers. Introducing a retail sector would
not a¤ect the analysis, provided that retailers operate at constant marginal costs, equal to average
costs, in perfectly competitive markets. Under these hypotheses, it is equivalent to levy the tax on
producers or to retailers. Moreover, only producers make positive prots and have an incentive to
lobby for tax rates reductions.
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by rm j in region i, so that
mX
j=1
qji = Qi. (3)
Firm js prots are then dened as:
j =
2X
i=1
(pi   c  T   ti)qji. (4)
In each market i, rms compete à la Cournot by setting simultaneously and inde-
pendently their own quantity sold. By di¤erentiating (4) with respect to qji, i = 1; 2,
subject to (2) and (3), the necessary rst order conditions for prot maximization by
rm j can be written as:6
  T   ti  
P
k 6=j qki
bni
  2qji
bni
= 0, i = 1; 2, (5)
where we dene  = a   c to simplify the notation. By summing equations (5) over
j = 1; : : : ;m, one gets:
m(  T   ti)  (m  1)Qi
bni
  2Qi
bni
= 0, i = 1; 2.
From the latter equation we then obtain the equilibrium aggregate quantity as a func-
tion of the relevant tax rates:
Qi(T; ti) =
m
1 +m
b(  T   ti)ni, i = 1; 2. (6)
Notice that, since we are assuming identical rms, the equilibrium is symmetric, with
qji(T; ti) = m
 1Qi(T; ti), j = 1; : : : ;m. In what follows we restrict the analysis to
market equilibria such that  > T + ti, in order to ensure that Qi(T; ti) > 0.
By substituting Qi(T; ti) into (2) and then solving for pi we get the equilibrium
consumersprice:
pi(T; ti) = c+ T + ti +
  (T + ti)
1 +m
, i = 1; 2. (7)
For given tax rates, the consumersprice is decreasing in the number of rms, ranging
from its highest level when the market is monopolized (m = 1) to its asymptotically
lowest level (marginal cost pricing) when the market approaches perfect competition
(m!1).
6Under the given hypotheses (linear demand and linear production costs) the necessary rst order
conditions for prot maximization are also su¢ cient.
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Finally, by aggregating j in (4) over j = 1; : : : ;m, and then substituting for
pi(T; ti) and Qi(T; ti), we compute aggregate rmsprots (net of excise taxes, but
gross of contributions spent on lobbying activity, see Section 4):
(T; t1; t2) =
2X
i=1
m
(1 +m)2
b(  T   ti)2ni. (8)
Notice that, as expected, prots are decreasing in m and tend to zero for m ! 1.
Moreover, taxation reduces prots, giving an incentive to rms to lobby the policy
makers for tax rates reductions.7
2.2 Social optimum
We dene the social optimum as the tax policy that maximizes the unweighted sum of
the policy makersobjective functions. In this case, neither vertical tax externalities
nor lobbying by rms distorts tax policy. The federal policy maker, as well as state 1
policy maker, are assumed to be pure Leviathans, aiming at maximizing tax revenue.
In addition to tax revenue, state 2 policy maker cares about workerswelfare in the
taxed industry.
Using the expression for Qi(T; ti) in (6), it is immediate to derive the formulae for
tax revenue for, respectively, the federal and the state governments:
R(T; t1; t2) =
2X
i=1
Qi(T; ti)T =
2X
i=1
m
1 +m
b(  T   ti)niT , (9)
ri(T; ti) = Qi(T; ti)ti =
m
1 +m
b(  T   ti)niti, i = 1; 2. (10)
As a proxy for workerswelfare, consider aggregate production costs in the taxed
industry:
C(T; t1; t2) =
2X
i=1
cQi(T; ti) =
2X
i=1
m
1 +m
cb(  T   ti)ni. (11)
It is then assumed that the objective function of state 2 policy maker is given by a
weighted sum of tax revenue and production costs:
r2(T; t2) + !C(T; t1; t2), (12)
7Taxation has always a negative impact on prots when the market is monopolized (m = 1). In
oligopoly (m  2), taxation may cause price overshifting, and therefore it may increase prots, provided
that the slope of the demand curve is of a particular type (Seade, 1985). With a linear demand, however,
taxation always reduces prots also in oligopoly.
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where ! 2 [0; 1]. There are at least two alternative ways of interpreting the term
!C(:) in the objective function (12). If we assume that labor is the only input into
production, so that C(:) represents total wages paid to workers, then ! represents a
taste parameter, showing that the policy maker is ready to give up one dollar of tax
revenue provided that wage outlays are increased by at least ! dollars. If, instead, we
assume that labor costs account for only a part of total costs C(:), and that the policy
maker is ready to substitute tax revenue and wage outlays one dollar for one dollar,
then the parameter ! represents the labor costsshare in production costs C(:).
Given these hypotheses, the social optimum is dened by the tax rates that max-
imize:
W (T; t1; t2) = R(T; t1; t2) +
2X
i=1
ri(T; ti) + !C(T; t1; t2). (13)
It is immediate to see, from the expressions for tax revenues (9)(10) and for production
costs (11), that the objective function (13) depends on the total tax rates (i.e. T + ti,
i = 1; 2) in each region, since federal and state taxation are perfect substitutes. The
social optimum, that we characterize in the following proposition, corresponds therefore
to the tax policy that would be chosen by a single decision maker aiming at maximizing
the objective function (13).
Proposition 1 In the social optimum, the optimal tax rates are:
T^ + t^i =
1
2
  1
2
!c, i = 1; 2. (14)
Proof. Substituting for T + ti =  i, i = 1; 2, in eq. (13) one gets:
W (1; 2) =
m
1 +m
2X
i=1
b(   i)ni( i + !c).
By di¤erentiating this expression with respect to  i we then get the rst order condition
  2 i   !c = 0 that gives the solution ^ i in (14).
Since federal and state tax rates are, within each region, perfect substitutes, the
social optimum denes only the total level of taxation, leaving undetermined its sharing
between the upper and lower layers of government. As expected, the optimal tax rates
are a decreasing function of !, since labor costs are monotonically decreasing in the
level of taxation. If all policy makers are pure Leviathans (i.e. ! = 0) then the social
optimum implies the maximization of aggregate tax revenue, at the bliss point of the
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La¤er curve in each region. Notice also that the optimal tax rates are uniform across
regions, since the aggregate objective function (13) treats symmetrically labor costs
(locatedin region 2) and tax revenue in all regions and at all levels of government.
Notice nally that the optimal tax rates are independent of market structure (the
number of rms, m), although the optimal levels of tax revenue are increasing in m.
3 Tax policy in the absence of lobbying
In this section we consider tax policy in the absence of lobbying by rms. Therefore,
each policy maker sets, simultaneously and independently from the other policy makers,
its own tax rate. The Nash equilibrium of this game is characterized in the following:
Proposition 2 Suppose there is no lobbying by rms and that each policy maker non-
cooperatively and simultaneously sets its own tax rate. In the unique Nash Equilibrium,
tax rates are:
~T =
1
3
+
n2
3
!c, (15)
~t1 =
1
3
  n2
6
!c, (16)
~t2 =
1
3
 

n2
6
+
1
2

!c, (17)
while total tax rates are:
~T + ~t1 =
2
3
+
n2
6
!c, (18)
~T + ~t2 =
2
3
+

n2
6
  1
2

!c. (19)
Proof. Denote with T (:), t1(:) and t2(:), respectively, the best response function
(or reaction function) of the federal, state 1 and state 2 policy makers to any given tax
policy chosen by the other policy makers. Formally, by maximizing R(:) in (9) with
respect to T , r1(:) in (10) with respect to t1, and r2(:) + !C(:) in (12) with respect to
t2, and then solving for the relevant tax rate, we obtain, respectively,
T (t1; t2) =
1
2
(  n1t1   n2t2), (20)
t1(T ) =
1
2
(  T ), (21)
t2(T ) =
1
2
(  T   !c). (22)
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The best response functions (20)(22) form a system of linear equations in the tax rates
T , t1 and t2. Its solution gives the unique Nash equilibrium (15)(17) and the total
tax rates (18)(19).
Taxation is uniform, both between layers of government and across regions, if all
policy makers are pure Leviathans (! = 0). Taxation is instead asymmetric, with
~T > ~t1 > ~t2 for individual tax rates, and ~T + ~t1 > ~T + ~t2 for total tax rates, if the
policy maker in state 2 attaches some weight on wage outlays in the taxed industry
(! > 0). The size of the asymmetry depends not only on the size of ! but also on the
mass, n2, of consumers that are resident in state 2. The sources of the asymmetry are
clear by looking at the reaction functions (20)(22). The state 2 policy makers concern
for workerswelfare, represented by the term  !c=2 in her reaction function, causes a
downward pressure on t2. In turn, this induces the federal government to increase its
tax rate T ; but this in turn induces the policy maker in state 1 to decrease her tax
rate t1, thus reinforcing the incentive for the federal policy maker to increase her tax
rate T . The deviation from Leviathan behavior of state 2 policy maker bears therefore
an impact on state 1 tax policy that is channeled through the reaction of the federal
policy maker.
Let us now formally compare, in the following proposition, the total tax rates in
the Nash equilibrium with those obtained in Proposition 1 for the social optimum.
Proposition 3 The comparison between total tax rates in the Nash Equilibrium without
lobbying and the corresponding total tax rates in the social optimum is as follows:
~T + ~t1   (T^ + t^1) = 1
6
+

n2
6
+
1
2

!c > 0 (23)
~T + ~t2   (T^ + t^2) = 1
6
+
n2
6
!c > 0 (24)
Proof. By simple subtraction of the tax rates in (14) from the corresponding tax
rates in (18)(19).
This proposition makes it clear that, because of vertical tax externalities, inde-
pendent tax setting determines over-taxation with respect to the social optimum. As
expected, for ! > 0 the upward bias in total taxation is more severe in state 1 than in
state 2. Somewhat surprisingly, the concern for workerswelfare reinforces overtaxa-
tion also in state 2, as shown by the second term in expression (24); this result can be
explained by observing that lower taxation at the state level is more than compensated
by higher taxation at the federal level.
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4 Lobbying for tax rates cuts
We are now ready to address the central issue of the paper, by examining what happens
when the producers exert pressure on policy makers in order to obtain a more favorable
taxation of their sales. Concerning lobbying behavior, the rst assumption we make is
that of full cooperation among rms: while competing in their product market, rms
act as a single body when making pressure on policy makers for tax rates cuts.8 This is
likely to be the case, for instance, when producers deal with other economic institutions
(e.g. trade unions, consumersorganizations) by means of an association representing
their interests. The second assumption we make is that the lobbying activity takes a
legal and public form, in which the producers association makes monetary o¤ers
to policy makers (in the form of campaign contributions, for instance) conditional on
tax rates cuts. This buying inuenceapproach for modelling lobbying behavior has
been popularized in the context of common agencygames by Dixit et al. (1997) and
Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2001), building on previous work by Bernheim and
Whinston (1986a,b). However, their common agency framework  in which there are
many principals, the lobbying groups, and one agent, the policy maker does not t
into our setting, starring one principal (the producers association) and many agents
(the policy makers). We therefore appeal to the model in Segal (1999) that, although
not focusing explicitly on lobbying activities, is cast in terms of a single principal
contracting with many agents.9
Formally, the objective function of the federal policy maker is now given by:
V (T; t1; t2; Z) = R(T; t1; t2) + Z, (25)
where Z  0 represents the contribution o¤ered by rms, whereas , 0    1, is a
tasteparameter representing the importance that the policy maker attaches to one
dollar of contributions relative one dollar of tax revenue.10 The objective function of
8Clearly, there is no need to justify the presence of a single lobby when the market is monopolized.
9The more general class of many-principals many-agents models, known as games played through
agents, has been analyzed by Prat and Rustichini (2003).
10Most of the literature on lobbying focuses on the case in which utility is transferable between the
principal(s) and the agent(s), by assuming  = 1. The taste parameter  was rst introduced by
Persson (1998).
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the state policy makers is amended in a similar way:
v1(T; t1; z1) = r1(T; t1) + z1, (26)
v2(T; t1; t2; z2) = r2(T; t2) + !C(T; t1; t2) + z2, (27)
where zi  0, i = 1; 2, is the contribution paid to state i policy maker. Notice that we
are assuming that policy makers have identical preferences for the lobbyists contribu-
tions, since the parameter  is uniform.
Net of contributions to policy makers, rms aggregate prots are equal to:
(T; t1; t2; Z; z1; z2) = (T; t1; t2)  (Z + z1 + z2), (28)
where aggregate gross prots, (T; t1; t2), are dened in (8). Since rms are identical,
it is assumed that the monetary contributions are equally shared among them.
Following Segal (1999), we set up a two-stage game. In the rst stage, the rms
association (the principal) credibly sends a triplet of o¤ers, (T ; Z), (t1; z1) and
(t2; z2), to the federal, state 1 and state 2 policy makers (the agents), respectively. We
assume, as in Segal (1999, Section III), that these o¤ers are publicly observed.11 In the
second stage, the policy makers simultaneously decide whether to accept or reject their
respective o¤ers. A policy maker accepting her o¤er would cash the contribution and
implement the tax rate attachedto the o¤er. A policy maker not accepting the o¤er
would instead cash no contribution and would be free to set the tax rate that max-
imizes her own objective function. Within this kind of game, we now characterize the
Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibria that maximize the producers aggregate net prots.12
Formally, the producers association select the o¤ers (T ; Z), (t1; z1) and (t2; z2)
that maximize its net prots (28) subject to the policy makers participation con-
11Like in the literature quoted above, we assume that information is complete. Concerning her o¤ers
to the agents, however, the principal can make either public o¤ers (Segal, Section III) or private o¤ers
(Segal, Section IV). For simplicity, we focus on public o¤ers, although we recognize that also the case
of private o¤ers could be of interest.
12 In general, this kind of games admit a multiplicity of equilibria. Following Segal (1999), we thus
focus on the Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE) that are preferred by the principal. Moreover,
given the specic functional forms we adopted for tax revenues and rms prots, the principals
preferred SPNE is unique.
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straints:
R(T; t1; t2) + Z  R [T (t1; t2); t1; t2] , (29)
r1(T; t1) + z1  r1 [T; t1(T )] , (30)
r2(T; t2) + !C(T; t1; t2) + z2  r2 [T; t2(T )] + !C [T; t1; t2(T )] , (31)
where T (t1; t2), t1(T ) and t2(T ) are the best response functions dened in (20)(22).
The left-hand sides of these inequalities contain the objective functions, dened in
(25)(27), of the corresponding policy maker. The key point is the characterization,
in the right-hand sides of the inequalities, of the outside options of the policy makers.
To illustrate, consider the participation constraint (29) of the federal policy maker (a
similar interpretation can be given for the other participation constraints). Were this
agent to reject the o¤er made by the principal, his payo¤would include only the federal
tax revenue, that in turn depends on the tax rates, t1 and t2, set by the state policy
makers, as well as on his own best response, T (t1; t2), to these tax rates. The outside
option of the federal policy maker is therefore endogenous to the tax rates set by the
other policy makers. In this respect, our framework is more complex than the one
considered in Segal (1999), in which the agentsoutside options (or non trade options,
in his terminology) are instead exogenously given.
Notice that the association of producers can always make a trivialset of o¤ers to
policy makers, formally ( ~T ; 0), (~t1; 0) and (~t2; 0), in which no contributions are o¤ered
in exchange for the tax rates (15)(17) that would be set in the Nash equilibrium in
the absence of lobbying (Proposition 2). We can thus focus, without loss of generality,
only on the triplets of o¤ers satisfying the participation constraints (29)(31) and such
that each policy maker accepts the o¤er made by the principal. Moreover, it is also
immediate to see that a prot maximizing principal will make only o¤ers such that all
participation constraints are binding: if a participation constraint does not hold as an
equality, the principal can always reduce the contribution to the agent without inducing
her to reject the o¤er.13 These remarks allow us to use the participation constraints
(29)(31), holding as equality, to dene the monetary contribution as a function of the
13 In equilibrium, all policy makers are therefore indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the o¤er
presented to them by the rms association. Being indi¤erent, we then make the standard assumption
that the agents accept the o¤ers, since this is the outcome preferred by the principal.
13
relevant tax rates:
Z(T; t1; t2) = 
 1 fR [T (t1; t2); t1; t2] R(T; t1; t2)g , (32)
z1(T; t1) = 
 1 fr1 [T; t1(T )]  r1(T; t1)g , (33)
z2(T; t1; t2) = 
 1 fr2 [T; t2(T )] + !C [T; t1; t2(T )]  r2(T; t2)  !C(T; t1; t2)g .
(34)
These contributions satisfying the policy makers participation constraints are then
plugged into the expression (28) for rms aggregate net prots, to get:
(T; t1; t2) = (T; t1; t2) + 
 1W (T; t1; t2)+
  1
(
R [T (t1; t2); t1; t2] +
2X
i=1
ri [T; ti(T )] + !C [T; t1; t2(T )]
)
, (35)
where W (T; t1; t2) is the sum of the policy makers objective functions dened in (13).
Notice that, for  = 1, the sum of the rst two terms in the expression (35), (:)+W (:),
is equal to the joint surplus of the principal and the agents. Were the third term in
curly brackets absent, the maximization of net prots (T; t1; t2) would thus lead to
an e¢ cient outcome for the principal and the agents (Segal, 1999, proposition 1). This
latter term, that accounts for the externalities that each agent causes on the other
agentsreservation utilities, causes the chosen policy by the principal to fall short of
the e¢ cient outcome.14
The rms association selects the tax rates to be included in the o¤ers made to
policy makers by maximizing its net prots (35). Denote the solution to this problem
with T , t1 and t2. By substituting these optimal tax rates into eqs. (32)(34) we
then nd the optimal monetary contributions, Z = Z(T ; t1; t2), z1 = z1(T ; t1) and
z2 = z2(T ; t1; t2). Finally, the equilibrium net prots are determined by substituting
the optimal tax rates and contributions into eq. (28). The equilibrium tax rates are
presented in the following:
Proposition 4 Suppose that the association of producers lobbies the policy makers for
tax rates reductions. Let:
 =

1 +m
,  =
9  12
9  8 , 12 =
(19  16)
(9  8)(1  ) , 2 =
1
1   .
14We do not formally make the comparison between the equilibrium outcome and the e¢ cient out-
come that maximizes the joint surplus of the principal and the agents, since our interest is on the
comparison between tax policy under lobbying and the socially optimal policy.
14
In the unique Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the lobbying game, tax rates are:
T  = 

1
3


+
n2
3
!c

, (36)
t1 = 

1
3


+ (1  12)

 n2
6
!c

, (37)
t2 = 

1
3


+ (1  12)

 n2
6
!c

+2

 1
2
!c

, (38)
while total tax rates are:
T  + t1 = 

2
3


+ (2  1 + 12)
n2
6
!c

, (39)
T  + t2 = 

2
3


+ (2  1 + 12)
n2
6
!c

+2

 1
2
!c

, (40)
where
2  1 + 12 = 3(3  2)
(9  8)(1  ) .
Proof. By di¤erentiating the net prots function (35) with respect to the tax rates,
we get the rst order conditions:

@
@T
+
@W
@T
 
2X
i=1

@ri
@T
+
@ri
@ti
@ti(:)
@T

  !

@C
@T
+
@C
@t2
@t2(:)
@T

= 0, (41)

@
@t1
+
@W
@t1
 

@R
@T
@T (:)
@t1
+
@R
@t1

  !@C
@t1
= 0, (42)

@
@t2
+
@W
@t2
 

@R
@T
@T (:)
@t2
+
@R
@t2

= 0, (43)
where
@W
@T
=
@R
@T
+
2X
i=1
@ri
@T
+ !
@C
@T
,
@W
@ti
=
@R
@ti
+
@ri
@ti
+ !
@C
@ti
, i = 1; 2.
Using eqs. (8), (9), (10) and (11) to compute the partial derivatives with respect to ,
R, ri and C, respectively; using eqs. (20)(22) to compute the partial derivatives of
the reaction functions T (:), t1(:) and t2(:), and then solving the linear equation system
(41)(43), we get the equilibrium tax rates (36)(38).
Expressions (36)(40) for the tax rates under lobbying can be easily compared with
the corresponding expressions (15)(19) in Proposition 2 for the tax rates in the absence
of lobbying. Formally, the impact of lobbying on tax policy is fully captured by the
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coe¢ cients , 12 and 2. If  = 0 (lobbying is not e¤ective, because policy makers
do not care about campaign contributions) and/or if m!1 (the market approaches
perfect competition, so that prots tend to zero and rms have no incentive to lobby),
then  = 1, 12 = 0 and 2 = 1, and therefore the tax rates in (36)(40) are equal to
the corresponding tax rates in (15)(19).
Consider the rst (common) terms in tax rates (36)(40), those reecting the Le-
viathan objectives of the policy makers. It is straightforward to see that:
for given m, () > 0, 0() < 0, (0) = 1, (1) =
9m  3
9m+ 1
< 1.
Therefore, in the absence of concern for workerswelfare (! = 0), lobbying reduces all
tax rates to the same extent ( < 1), and the more so the larger is . Moreover, the
higher the number of rms, the lower the impact of lobbying in reducing the tax rates.
For instance, if the market is monopolized (m = 1) and  = 1, then  = 35 , so that
lobbying reduces the Leviathan component of tax rates by 40%; if, instead, m = 11
and  = 1, then  = :96, so that the impact of lobbying is to reduce this component
of the tax rates by only 4%.
Consider now the terms in the tax rates (36)(38) that depend on the parameter !,
reecting the interest of the state 2 policy maker about workerswelfare in the taxed
industry. We can show that:
for given m, 12() > 0, 012() > 0, 12(0) = 0, 12(1) =
19m+ 3
(9m+ 1)m
,
for given m, 2() > 0, 02() > 0, 2(0) = 1, 2(1) =
1 +m
m
.
Hence, for ! > 0 and  > 0, lobbying tends (a) to reduce the federal tax rate, T , since
the second term in (36) is multiplied by  < 1; (b) to increase (somewhat surprisingly)
the state 1 tax rate, t1, since the second term in (37) is multiplied by (1   12) < 1;
and (c) both to increase and to decrease the state 2 tax rate, t2, since the second and
the third terms in (38) are multiplied by (1  12) < 1 and 2 > 0, respectively (it is
likely, however, that the third term prevails over the second one).
As for the total tax rates (39)(40), it is immediate to see that (2  1 + 12) > 1
for  > 0. Therefore, lobbying: (a) reduces the rst term in (39)(40); (b) increases
the second term in (39)(40); (c) increases, in absolute value, the third term in (40).
To illustrate the impact of the parameters  and m on the total tax rates, it is useful
to look, in Figure 1, at the results of a numerical simulation (the other parameters are
set at n1 = n2 = :5, ! = :8,  = 3). Figure 1a shows the total tax rate T  + t1 in the
16
Figure 1a: Non-producer state
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Figure 1b: Producer state
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Figure 1c: Producer vs. Non-producer state
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non-producer state as a function of , for di¤erent levels of m. As expected, a more
e¤ective lobbying (a higher ), causes a higher reduction in the total tax rate, and the
more so the smaller is the number of producers, m. Total tax rates in the producer
state, T  + t2, see Figure 1b, show a qualitative similar pattern, although, as shown in
Figure 1c for m = 1, they are always below those set in the non-producer state.
5 Tax assignment with Leviathan policy makers
We now examine the tax assignment problem. In order to get clear-cut results, we
focus on the special case in which all policy makers are revenue maximizers. In this
setting, it is immediate to show that:
Lemma 1 If all policy makers are pure Leviathans (i.e. ! = 0), it is then equivalent
to assign the power to tax either to the federal government or to the state governments,
whether rms lobby the policy makers or not.
Proof. Suppose that only the federal government can levy the excise tax at rate
 = T , with ti = 0, i = 1; 2. From eq. (9), aggregate tax revenue is then equal
to R( ; 0; 0) =
P2
i=1 b(   )ni ,  = m(1 + m) 1, while from eq. (8) aggregate
prots are ( ; 0; 0) =
P2
i=1 (1 +m)
 1b(  )2ni. Soppose now that only the state
governments can levy the tax, at rates  i = ti, T = 0. From eqs. (10) and (8),
aggregate tax revenue and gross prots are then equal to
P2
i=1 ri(0;  i) = b(  i)ni i,
(0; 1; 2) =
P2
i=1 (1+m)
 1b(  i)2ni, respectively. By symmetry, and since there
are no horizontal tax externalities between the state governments, in equilibrium (with,
or without, lobbying) 1 = 2. Therefore, R( ; 0; 0) =
P2
i=1 ri(0;  i) and ( ; 0; 0) =
(0; 1; 2), that gives the equivalence result.
Since (a) policy makers are assumed to have the same policy objective (tax revenue
maximization), (b) policy makers are assumed to show the same interest for campaign
contributions (i.e. uniform ), and (c) there are no horizontal tax externalities between
the state governments, then centralized tax setting turns out to be equivalent to de-
centralized tax setting. For the tax assignment problem, the relevant comparison is
therefore between taxation by both layers of government and taxation by anyone of the
two layers, using the social optimum as a normative benchmark. In this respect, the
following proposition focuses on the equilibrium tax rates.
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Proposition 5 Let  = (1+m) 1. Suppose that all policy makers are pure Leviathans
(i.e. ! = 0). Then:
 The socially optimal tax rates are (Proposition 1):
T^ + t^i =
1
2
, i = 1; 2.
 If both layers of government have the power to tax, and if rms lobby the policy
makers, the equilibrium total tax rates are (Proposition 4):
T  + ti =

9  12
9  8

2
3


, i = 1; 2.
Ifm = 1, then T +ti R T^+t^i for  Q
3
4
. Ifm  2, m integer, then T +ti > T^+t^i
for all  2 [0; 1].
 If only one layer of government has the power to tax, at rate  i, and if rms lobby
the policy makers, the equilibrium (total) tax rates are:
i =

1  2
1  

1
2


, i = 1; 2,
where i  T^ + t^i for all m  1, m integer,  2 [0; 1].
Proof. The socially optimal tax rates come trivially from setting ! = 0 in eq.
(14). Similarly, from eqs. (39)(40), for the tax rates under tax base overlapping. It
is then immediate to see that T  + ti R T^ + t^i for  Q 3=8; thus, from the denition
of , T  + ti R T^ + t^i for  Q 3=4 if m = 1 and T  + ti > T^ + t^i for all  2 [0; 1] if
m  2. As for the tax rates i , suppose, using Lemma 1, that taxation is centralized.
Then, the association of rms makes an o¤er (; Z) to the federal policy maker
with the property that (; Z) = argmax( ; 0; 0)   Z, subject to the participation
constraint R( ; 0; 0)+Z = R(~ ; 0; 0), where ( ; 0; 0) =
P2
i=1 (1+m)
 1b(  )2ni,
R( ; 0; 0) =
P2
i=1 b(  )ni , ~ = argmaxR( ; 0; 0),  = m(1 +m) 1. The solution
to this constrained maximization problem gives the uniform tax rates i . Given that
m  1 and  2 [0; 1], then  2 [0; 1=2]; therefore i  T^ + t^i.
To interpret these results, one has to bear in mind that while tax bases overlapping
leads to excessive taxation, lobbying by rms leads to less than optimal taxation. The
nal outcome depends therefore on the balance between these two forces. If lobbying
is not e¤ective (i.e. if  = 0), or if the market approaches perfect competition (i.e. if
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m ! 1), then  = 0, and therefore taxation is excessive under tax base overlapping
(T  + ti > T^ + t^i) whereas it is socially optimal in the absence of tax base overlapping
(i = T^ + t^i).
For  > 0, the equilibrium tax rates are a decreasing function of , for given m.
Taxation by both layers of government implements the social optimum in the special
case in which the market is monopolized (m = 1) and lobbying is highly inuential
( = 3=4). With two, or more, rms, tax base overlapping leads to excessive taxation
even if lobbying exerts its maximal inuence on tax policy ( = 1). Instead, taxation
by one layer of government always falls short of the social optimum.15
By comparing the equilibrium tax rates in the presence of lobbying, with and
without tax bases overlapping, with the tax rates in the social optimum, we can state
our nal result in the following:
Proposition 6 Suppose that all policy makers are pure Leviathans (! = 0) and that
rms lobby the policy makers for tax cuts. Let  = (5 p13)=8  :174. Then:
 If 1  m  4, m integer, and 0    (1 + m), then T  + ti   (T^ + t^i) 
T^ + t^i   i > 0. It is therefore optimal to assign the power to tax only to one
layer of government.
 If 1  m  4, m integer, and (1 + m) <   1, then T^ + t^i   i >T  + ti   (T^ + t^i) > 0. It is therefore optimal to assign the power to tax to
both layers of government.
 If m  5, m integer, then T + ti   (T^ + t^i)  T^ + t^i i > 0 for all 0    1. It
is therefore optimal to assign the power to tax only to one layer of government.
Proof. We know, from Proposition 5, that T^ + t^i   i  0 for  2 [0; 1=2],
with equality for  = 0, increasing in . From the same proposition we know that
T  + ti   (T^ + t^i)  0 for  2 [0; 3=8], with equality for  = 3=8, decreasing in
. Therefore, there exists a unique threshold  < 3=8 such that T^ + t^i   i =
T  + ti   (T^ + t^i); by solving the latter equation one nds that  = (5  
p
13)=8.
Hence T  + ti   (T^ + t^i) R T^ + t^i   i for  Q . Recalling that  = =(1 +m), and
noting that 1=  5:737, it follows that if m  4 there exists a  = (1 +m) < 1,
15 In the special case in which  = 1, taxation by one layer of government implements the e¢ cient
policy for the principal and the agent(s), i.e. the policy that maximizes their joint surplus (tax revenue
plus gross prots).
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such that T  + ti   (T^ + t^i) R T^ + t^i   i for  Q ; if m  5, then (1 +m) > 1
and therefore T  + ti   (T^ + t^i)  T^ + t^i   i for all  2 [0; 1]. In order to identify the
optimal tax regime, i.e. the one that maximizes tax revenue, it is then su¢ cient to see
which tax rates are closer to the socially optimal tax rates, since the revenue functions
are quadratic (therefore single peaked and symmetric) in the tax rates.
If the market is highlyconcentrated, in particular with no more than four rms,
and if policy makers attach a high value to campaign contributions, in particular
 > (1 + m), so that lobbying is highly inuential, then the total tax rates in
the presence of tax base overlapping are closer to the socially optimal tax rates than
those in the absence of tax base overlapping. Hence total tax revenue is closer to the
social optimum under the former tax regime than under the latter. On the contrary,
if the market is highly concentrated (m  4), but lobbying is not very inuential
( < (1 + m)), or if the market is composed of at least ve rms, whatever their
lobbying inuence, then the optimal tax regime is the one assigning the power to tax to
only one layer of government, because its tax rates and revenue are closer to the socially
optimal values than those prevailing when both layers of government are entitled to
tax.
The intuition for this result is the following. In the absence of lobbying, tax base
overlapping leads to excessive taxation because of the vertical tax externalities between
the two layers of government, whereas the one-layer tax regime implements the social
optimum. For tax base overlapping to become the optimal regime, it is therefore
necessary that lobbying causes a large downward distortion on tax rates, so that those
under tax base overlapping get close to the social optimum, while those under no tax
base overlapping fall well below the social optimum. But for lobbying to be highly
e¤ective, it is necessary that inuence () is high and that prots are high (small
number of rms, m). Notice also that, although lobbying by rms tends to reduce the
equilibrium tax rates in both regimes, its impact is more relevant, for given inuence
() and market structure (m), when taxation is assigned to one layer of government
than to both of them. In fact, in the latter case it is more di¢ cult to buyinuence,
since the externalities between the two levels of government call for compensating a
policy maker not only for the distortions of her own tax rate but also for those on the
tax rates of the other policy makers.
21
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have examined how tax setting in a federation with two layers of gov-
ernment is inuenced by the lobbying activity of a special interest group. Concerning
the tax assignment problem, our model highlights the antagonistic roles of vertical tax
externalities and of lobbying pressure, with the former pushing tax rates above, and
the latter below, their socially optimal level. In terms of tax revenue collected, the
optimal tax regime was shown to depend on market structure and on the ability of the
lobby to inuence the policy makers. Therefore, our main conclusion is that the issue
of tax assignment should not be dealt with without taking political institutions into
account, in particular the role that special interest groups might play.
Among the possible extensions of our model, an important one concerns the intro-
duction of the possibility of cross border shopping by consumers, induced by di¤eren-
tials in local tax rates. An additional factor, namely horizontal tax externalities among
state governments, would come into play to dene the optimal tax regime. Another
possible extension is to consider a more general class of objective functions for the
policy makers, including measures of consumerssurplus and, depending on the type
of commodity taxed, paternalistic concerns (for limiting consumption, e.g. cigarettes)
or the internalization of external e¤ects (e.g. the consumption of pollution generating
goods).
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